



# Mark Scheme (Results)

Summer 2023

Pearson Edexcel  
In GCE History (8HI0/1E)  
Advanced Subsidiary

Paper 1: Breadth study with  
interpretations

Option 1E: Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin  
to Yeltsin

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## General Marking Guidance

- All candidates must receive the same treatment. Examiners must mark the first candidate in exactly the same way as they mark the last.
- Mark schemes should be applied positively. Candidates must be rewarded for what they have shown they can do rather than penalised for omissions.
- Examiners should mark according to the mark scheme not according to their perception of where the grade boundaries may lie.
- There is no ceiling on achievement. All marks on the mark scheme should be used appropriately.
- All the marks on the mark scheme are designed to be awarded. Examiners should always award full marks if deserved, i.e. if the answer matches the mark scheme. Examiners should also be prepared to award zero marks if the candidate's response is not worthy of credit according to the mark scheme.
- Where some judgement is required, mark schemes will provide the principles by which marks will be awarded and exemplification may be limited.
- When examiners are in doubt regarding the application of the mark scheme to a candidate's response, the team leader must be consulted.
- Crossed out work should be marked UNLESS the candidate has replaced it with an alternative response.

## Generic Level Descriptors: sections A and B

Target: AO1: Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material
1	1–4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic.</li> <li>Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question.</li> <li>The overall judgement is missing or asserted.</li> <li>There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.</li> </ul>
2	5–10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the question.</li> <li>Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question.</li> <li>An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation, and the criteria for judgement are left implicit.</li> <li>The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.</li> </ul>
3	11–16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included.</li> <li>Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth.</li> <li>Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation.</li> <li>The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.</li> </ul>
4	17–20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven.</li> <li>Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands.</li> <li>Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported.</li> <li>The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.</li> </ul>

## Section C

Target: AO3: Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demonstrates only limited comprehension of the extracts, selecting some material relevant to the debate.</li> <li>• Some relevant contextual knowledge is included, with limited linkage to the extracts.</li> <li>• Judgement on the view is assertive, with little or no supporting evidence</li> </ul>
2	5–10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the extracts by describing some points within them that are relevant to the debate.</li> <li>• Contextual knowledge is added to information from the extracts, but only to expand on matters of detail or to note some aspects which are not included.</li> <li>• A judgement on the view is given, but with limited support and related to the extracts overall, rather than specific issues</li> </ul>
3	11–16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demonstrates understanding of the extracts and shows some analysis by selecting and explaining some key points of interpretation they contain and indicating differences</li> <li>• Knowledge of some issues related to the debate is included to link to, or expand, some views given in the extracts.</li> <li>• A judgement is given and related to some key points of view in the extracts and discussion is attempted, albeit with limited substantiation.</li> </ul>
4	17–20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demonstrates understanding of the extracts, analysing the issues of interpretation raised by comparison of them.</li> <li>• Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge to discuss the views. Most of the relevant aspects of the debate will be discussed, although treatment of some aspects may lack depth.</li> <li>• Discusses evidence in order to reach a supported overall judgement. Discussion of points of view in the extracts demonstrates understanding that the issues are matters of interpretation.</li> </ul>

## Section A: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
1	<p><b>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</b></p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether the actions of the secret police were the main reason for the survival of the Soviet regime in the years 1917-28.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that the actions of the secret police were the main reason for the survival of the Soviet regime in the years 1917-28 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The secret police undermined the regime's opponents, e.g. the Cheka participated in the Constituent Assembly forced closure (1918), the Kronstadt naval base attack (1921) and the mass execution of priests</li> <li>• Under War Communism (1918-21), the Cheka requisitioned grain from the peasantry to ensure that the Red Army, then fighting in the civil war to defend the regime, had access to regular food supplies</li> <li>• From 1922 the secret police subjected potentially disloyal groups, such as ex-Tsarist army officers and intellectuals, to surveillance and hostage-taking to minimise the threat to the regime; some of these were deported</li> <li>• During the NEP (1921-28), the secret police combatted the potentially negative consequences of the NEP for the regime, e.g. organising the 1922 SR show trial and persecuting rich Nepmen and people with western tastes.</li> </ul> <p>Arguments and evidence that other factors/developments were the main reason for the survival of the Soviet regime in the years 1917-28 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bolshevik control of the press and radio ensured that the population was targeted with cheap and readily accessible pro-socialist propaganda in order to win hearts and minds, e.g. <i>Pravda</i> and <i>Izvestiya</i></li> <li>• The Bolsheviks used the arts and culture to secure popular endorsement of their vision of a new socialist society, e.g. through <i>Proletkult</i> and the avant-garde</li> <li>• The Bolsheviks created the Red Army as an effective fighting force, enabling the Communist Party to overcome domestic and foreign military threats during the civil war and extend its territorial control</li> <li>• The Bolsheviks were pragmatic, making concessions in order to retain and extend their power, e.g. the Treaty of Brest Litovsk in 1918 and the introduction of the NEP in 1921.</li> </ul> <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>

Question	Indicative content
2	<p><b>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</b></p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether <b>Stalin's cult of personality</b> was the main reason for his power in the USSR in the years 1928-53.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that <b>Stalin's cult of personality was the main reason for his power in the USSR in the years 1928-53</b> should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stalin's cult of personality was important because it established him as Lenin's loyal disciple and natural successor, e.g. the 1920s slogan 'Stalin is the Lenin of today' used by some party members</li> <li>• In the 1930s, Stalin's personality cult underpinned his growing personal power (the <i>vozhd</i>) by rewriting Soviet history to inflate his importance and portraying him as a visionary socialist, e.g. the two 1938 official histories</li> <li>• Stalin's cult of personality peaked in the late 1940s, reinforcing his dominance following the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, e.g. his portrayal as Generalissimo – military genius and saviour of the USSR</li> <li>• By 1945 Stalin's personality cult had persuaded many Soviet citizens that he was the all-powerful saviour of socialism and protector of Russia; it also enhanced his power by engendering respect among his critics.</li> </ul> <p>Arguments and evidence that Stalin's cult of personality was not the main reason and/or other factors/developments were the main reason for Stalin's power in the USSR in the years 1928-53 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• By the mid-late 1930s, the excesses of the personality cult were becoming counterproductive and some Soviet citizens, including workers, intellectuals and party members, were becoming cynical</li> <li>• <b>Stalin's</b> economic policies consolidated his power by appealing to ordinary communists and patriotic workers, controlling the peasantry, securing victory in the Second World War and facilitating post-war recovery</li> <li>• Stalin relied heavily on terror, coercion and intimidation to retain power throughout this period, e.g. the purges of the 1930s and the use of similar tactics after 1945</li> <li>• <b>Stalin's control over the media and his promotion of socialist realist art</b> strengthened his power by motivating the committed with a vision of the USSR moving <b>towards the 'perfect' socialist society</b>.</li> </ul> <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>

## Section B: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
3	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the extent to which Soviet leaders, in the years 1953-85, pursued similar policies on the arts and culture.</p> <p>Argument and evidence that Soviet leaders, in the years 1953-85, pursued similar policies on the arts and culture should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Andropov all pursued policies on the arts and culture that attempted to prevent widespread nonconformity in Soviet society, e.g. banning <i>Dr Zhivago</i> (1954), expelling Solzhenitsyn (1974) and vetting rock groups (1980s)</li> <li>• Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Andropov all pursued conservative policies that promoted traditional Russian high culture, e.g. in music, literature and ballet</li> <li>• Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Andropov all pursued policies that permitted some limited freedom of expression as a way of distinguishing their regimes from Stalin's more hard-line approach to art and culture, e.g. Khrushchev's cultural 'thaws' and Andropov's partial toleration of underground art</li> <li>• Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Andropov all pursued policies on the arts and culture that failed to curb artistic and cultural rebellion, e.g. <i>samizdat</i> publications from the late 1950s, the Moscow Conceptualists in the 1970s and the influence of popular music on the younger generation in the 1980s.</li> </ul> <p>Argument and evidence that Soviet leaders, in the years 1953-85, pursued different policies on the arts and culture should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unlike Brezhnev and Andropov, Khrushchev's policies on art and culture zig-zagged between 'thaw' and 'freeze', e.g. the temporary cultural liberalisation of 1953-54, 1956-57 and 1961-62</li> <li>• Brezhnev's policies of cultural conservatism rejected Khrushchev's cultural liberalism on the grounds that the latter was undermining faith in the Soviet Union, e.g. the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial (1966)</li> <li>• Unlike Khrushchev and Andropov, Brezhnev pursued policies on art and culture that celebrated the achievements of the Stalinist period and focused on the Soviet victory in the Second World War.</li> </ul> <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>



Question	Indicative content
4	<p><b>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment</b> of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that government educational policy failed to improve the lives of the Soviet population in the years 1917-85.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that government educational policy failed to improve the lives of the Soviet population in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of resources hindered the <b>government's plans for a universal</b> programme of compulsory education until the 1950s, e.g. limited spending on education, underfunded school transport and low wages for teachers</li> <li>• Traditional rural, ethnic and cultural attitudes towards education were ingrained and ensured that some groups remained disadvantaged, e.g. rural children and Muslim females</li> <li>• The Soviet education system, at all levels, contained compulsory ideological content which to some extent reduced schools and universities to propaganda <b>agencies, e.g. Stalin's 'Short Course'</b> and the 1958 reforms</li> <li>• The main route to high status jobs in the USSR - academic secondary education - was expanded by Khrushchev but continued to be dominated by the children of the Soviet white-collar and managerial elite.</li> </ul> <p>Arguments and evidence that government educational policy did improve the lives of the Soviet population in the years 1917-85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Soviet regime established a system of universal compulsory education by the 1930s, raising the number of children who had access to the benefits of education from 14 million in 1929 to over 20 million in 1931</li> <li>• State campaigns led to the almost complete eradication of illiteracy during this period, e.g. by 1939 94 per cent of Soviet citizens were literate and by 1959 the literacy rate had risen to 99 per cent</li> <li>• The development of adult education (<i>rabfaki</i>) as a <b>'second chance'</b> provision from the 1950s enabled millions of Soviet citizens to study part-time for self-improvement and to enhance their job prospects</li> <li>• In the years 1953-80, student numbers in higher education increased from 1.5 million to 5 million; this expansion improved promotion/social mobility prospects for working class and female graduates.</li> </ul> <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>

## Section C: indicative content

Question	Indicative content
5	<p><b>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material</b> in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because the economy of the USSR was in crisis.</p> <p>Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider <b>historians' viewpoints</b> in framing their argument. Candidates should use their discussion of various views to reach a reasoned conclusion.</p> <p>In considering the given view, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <p>Extract 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gorbachev's policy of <i>perestroika</i> appeared to be responsible for the economic crisis that had developed by 1991</li> <li>• The economic crisis had several causes including lack of expertise, administrative confusion and poor coordination, currency collapse, inflation and worker discontent</li> <li>• Foreign policy commitments, notably the Cold War and intervention in Afghanistan, placed major financial burdens on the Soviet Union and contributed to the economic crisis.</li> </ul> <p>Extract 2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gorbachev was responsible for the collapse of Soviet power because he failed to address major domestic problems such as the economic crisis and the rise of nationalism</li> <li>• Gorbachev was overconfident and made a number of important mistakes, such as keeping conservatives in key positions and retaining Yeltsin</li> <li>• Gorbachev bears personal responsibility for the Soviet collapse because he made choices that led to the rapid disintegration of the USSR.</li> </ul> <p>Candidates should use their own knowledge of the issues to address the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union came about because the economy of the USSR was in crisis. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Gorbachev's flawed</b> pursuit of economic perestroika and the introduction of market mechanisms (1987) undermined the unity of the USSR by failing to produce adequate supplies of food and consumer goods</li> <li>• By 1990, intense competition between the various economic policy bodies contributed to the growing crisis of the Soviet economy, e.g. Gosplan, the State Commission, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Russian Federation</li> <li>• Gorbachev and his advisers believed, mistakenly, that market reforms could be grafted on to a command economy to create a successful socialist-capitalist hybrid, but this led to spiralling inflation</li> <li>• Fuelled by Soviet involvement in the cold war and intervention in Afghanistan, the USSR's military budget accounted for 25 per cent of GDP; this represented an unsustainable burden on the Soviet economy.</li> </ul>

	<p>Candidates should use their own knowledge of the issues related to the debate to address other conditional and/or contingent reasons which explain the collapse of the Soviet Union. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Gorbachev's</b> failure to address issues concerning the national minorities sensitively, undermined central government-republic relations, e.g. Nagorno-Karabakh (1988) and the Baltic republics (1990-91)</li> <li>• <b>Many of Gorbachev's policies had unintended consequences</b>, e.g. <i>glasnost</i> led to mounting public criticism of communist rule; Gorbachev was also unlucky, e.g. the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl in 1986</li> <li>• Gorbachev's failure to marginalise Yeltsin eventually enabled the latter to undermine <b>Gorbachev's and the central Soviet government's position and</b> encouraged the demands of the non-Russian republics for independence</li> <li>• Gorbachev's decision to amend Article 6 effectively ended the communist one-party state and permitted other parties to be set up and contest elections – this rendered the CPSU powerless by the end of 1990.</li> </ul> <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>
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